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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This matter is an appeal from a final judgment and
order of the Third Judicial District of Salt Lake County, State
of Utah.

An Order of Dismissal with prejudice was granted to the

defendant and filed on July 25, 1998.

(R. at 112-115.)

The Utah

Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to
Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah Code
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(j).

The Utah Supreme Court has

jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
§ 78-2-2(3) (j) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err as a matter of law in

granting defendant's motion for summary judgment when no genuine
issues of material fact exist regarding the validity and
authenticity of the signatures on the original Release?
Standard of Review:

Summary judgment is appropriate

when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

V-l Oil Co. v.

Utah State Tax Comiri'n, 942 P.2d 906, 910 (Utah 1996).

When

reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the Court of Appeals
determines whether the trial court erred in applying governing
law and whether it correctly held that there were no disputed

issues of material fact.

Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151

(Utah 1989) .
2.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it

denied plaintiff's Motion to Amend her Complaint to add fraud and
bad faith claims since she was unable to show that her altered
Release reflected the agreement of the parties?
Standard of Review:

A motion to amend should not be

granted where the pleader does not set forth a legally sufficient
claim.

Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1389 (Utah 1996).

The

Court of Appeals will not overturn a trial court's denial of a
motion to amend a pleading absent an abuse of discretion.
3.

Id.

Should damages be awarded to the defendant for

having to defend a frivolous appeal?
Standard of Review:

Pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah

Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Court may award damages upon
the request of a party or upon its own motion.

A frivolous

appeal is "one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by
existing law, or not based on a good-faith argument to extend,
modify or reverse existing law."

Utah R. App. P. 33(b).

2

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-25-16 governs when parol

evidence is admissible.

This statute is known as the best

evidence rule, which states that n[t]here can be no evidence of
the contents of a writing, other than the writing itself" except
for limited circumstances that do not apply to this case.

In

addition, the best evidence rule is also found in the Utah Rules
of Evidence, Rule 1002, which reads:
To provide the content of a writing,
recording, or photograph, the
original
writing, recording or photograph is required,
except as otherwise provided in these rules
or by other rules adopted by the Supreme
Court of this State or by Statute.
(Emphasis added.)
2.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-25-17 governs writings that

bear obvious alterations.

It reads:

The party producing as genuine a writing
which has been altered,
or appears to have
been altered after its execution in a part
material to the question in dispute must
account for the appearance of alteration.
He
may show that the alteration was made by
another without his concurrence, or was made
with the consent of the parties affected by
it, or otherwise properly or innocently made,

For the text of Utah Code Ann.§ 78-25-16, please see the Addendum to
this Brief.
3

or that the alteration does not change the
meaning or language of the instrument. If he
does this, he may give the writing in
evidence, but not otherwise.
(Emphasis added.)

3.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) s t a t e s in p a r t :

(a) Otherwise a p a r t y may amend h i s pleading
only by leave of court or by w r i t t e n consent
of the adverse p a r t y ; and leave s h a l l 2be
freely given when j u s t i c e so r e q u i r e s .
4.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 s t a t e s t h a t the court

may award reasonable a t t o r n e y s ' fees to a p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y i f the
court determines t h a t the action was without merit and not
brought or a s s e r t e d in good f a i t h . 3

In addition, Rule 33(a) of

the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides t h a t a p a r t y may
be awarded damages for having to defend a frivolous appeal. 4

2

The complete r u l e i s s e t out i n t h e Addendum t o t h i s B r i e f .

3

For t h e f u l l t e x t of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, p l e a s e see t h e Addendum
to t h i s Brief.
4

The complete r u l e i s s e t out i n t h e Addendum t o t h i s B r i e f .
4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case arose from an automobile accident that
occurred on or about September 23, 1990.

Nine months later,

Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, the liability carrier, and
plaintiff reached a settlement and an original Release was signed
by the plaintiff, Vickie M. Nielsen, at the advice of counsel.
Ms. Nielsen's attorney also signed the agreement.

This original

Release released the defendant and her insurer from all personal
injury and property damage claims arising from the automobile
accident•
One-and-a-half years atter the original Release was
signed, Ms. Nielsen's counsel contacted Liberty Mutual Insurance
Company's claims adjuster, Mr. David K. Gehris, notifying
Mr. Gehris that there "may" be a claim made regarding personal
injuries from this accident but that they had already settled the
property damage dispute.
Due to the large volume of claims handled by
Mr. Gehris, he took Ms. Nielsen's counsel at his word, and did
not go back and review the original Release on file; instead, he
began corresponding with Ms. Nielsen's counsel regarding the
personal injury claim.

When a new claims adjuster took over the

5

file in August of 1997, she reviewed the original Release, which
plainly released the defendant and her insurer from any personal
injury claim or property damage claim resulting from the
automobile accident.

She then informed defense counsel, who

immediately informed plaintiff's counsel of the original Release
and brought a Motion to Dismiss plaintiff's Complaint on the
basis of the original ReleasePlaintiff's counsel admitted and the trial court found
that the signatures on the original Release are the authentic
signatures of Ms. Nielsen and her counsel, and that only one
original Release existed.

Plaintiff and her counsel had no

reasonable explanation for the altered Release.

After

considering all the evidence presented by Ms. Nielsen, the trial
court found that no ambiguous language existed in the original
Release and that the parties' intent must be determined solely
from the language of the original Release without result to parol
evidence.

The trial court granted the defendant's Motion to

Dismiss and denied plaintiff's Motion to Amend her Complaint to
add new claims.

6

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

On or about September 23, 1990, an automobile

accident involving plaintiff Vickie M. Nielsen and defendant
Mary J. Hefferon occurred.
accident.

Ms. Hefferon was killed m

that

(R. 32.)
2.

In January 1991, Ms. Nielsen retained legal

counsel, Paul M. Halliday, Jr.
3.

(R. 57.)

On February 28, 1991, Ms. Nielsen's counsel

contacted Liberty Mutual Insurance Company ("Liberty Mutual"),
via a claims adjuster, Mr. David K Gehrig, to inform Liberty
Mutual that Mr. Halliday had been retained to represent
Ms. Nielsen's interests in the automobile accident that resulted
m

"personal property damage and injuries to our client."

61, f

(R.

1.)
4.

Ms. Nielsen m

On March 11, 1991, Liberty Mutual sent a check to
the amount of $1,000.00.

(R. 123 4:8-10.)

On

this check is a note that says it is for the total loss of her
vehicle.

(R. 123 at 4:17-19.)
5.

On May 30, 1991, Liberty Mutual settled the

property damage on Ms. Nielsen's husband's vehicle and sent a

7

settlement draft of $4,757.69 to him.

The note on the draft that

says that it is for the total loss of his vehicle.
6.

(R. 67.)

Finally, on June 5, 1991, Liberty Mutual issued a

settlement draft to Ms. Nielsen for $3,445.00.
draft states "final settlement."

(R. 76.)

The note on the

The day after this

draft was issued, Ms. Nielsen signed, and her attorney witnessed
by his signature, the original Release which discharged
Ms. Hefferon and Liberty Mutual of any claims that arose from the
automobile accident, including personal injuries and property
damage.

(R. 37.) 5
7.

Mr. Gehris of Liberty Mutual understood that the

settlement was a release of all claims, including personal injury
and property damage.
8.

(R. 30.)

Liberty Mutual did not hear from Ms. Nielsen or

her attorney until a year and a half later, on December 15, 1992,
when Ms. Nielsen's counsel wrote to Liberty Mutual:
"We settled the property dispute back in June
1991.

5

Attached to this Brief in the Addendum is a color copy of the original
Release. The trial court chose to return the original Release to defense
counsel for safekeeping, so the original was not made part of the record. (R.
123 at 26:23-27:4.) It will be produced to the Court of Appeals at the appeal
hearing or as directed by the Court of Appeals.
8

It appears that our client may need some back
surgery to correct injuries she received from
this accident. We are monitoring this matter
and we are notifying you that there will be a
claim made regarding personal injuries from
this accident."
(R. 77, 1 2.)
9.

Liberty Mutual took Mr. Halliday at his word and

did not double check the contents of the original Release it had
on file until August 1997, when a new claims adjuster was
assigned to the file.

She reviewed the file and discovered the

discharged claims in the original Release.

She then notified

defense counsel of this for the first time, and defense counsel
informed plaintiff's counsel of defendant's intent to rely on the
Release.

(R. 123 at 6:22-7:8; 8:5-11.)
10.

A hearing was held on the motions on February 26,

1998, where, for the first time, Ms. Nielsen's counsel requested
(R. 123.) b

to examine the original Release.

After he examined

the original Release, and consulted with his client,
Ms. Nielsen's counsel admitted to the court that their signatures
were indeed, on the document.

(R. 123 at 18:3-5.)

D

Ms. Nielsen's counsel contended that "despite numerous requests [the
defendant] failed to make the so-called "original" of the release available to
plaintiff's counsel for inspection." (R. 97.) However, he never
once
requested to see the original Release. (R. 123 at 9:20-10:2.)
9

11.

When asked by the court if Ms. Nielsen's counsel

had an original release on file, Ms. Nielsen's counsel replied he
did not, that he had only received "just that one, your Honor."
(R. 123 at 18:13-19.)
12.

At the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment,

the following exchange occurred between Judge Thorne and Paul M.
Halliday, Jr.:
THE COURT

Doesn't the best evidence rule require,
though, that I rely first on the
original signatures as opposed to a
photocopy of something that's been
changed?

MR. HALLIDAY:

Well, your Honor, I believe that we need
to examine that document to see if it's
a forgery. We have testimony that shows
that that was not our understanding. We
have a copy of what I had in my file.

THE COURT:

Well, are you disputing, then, that
these signatures are yours and your
client's?

MR. HANSEN:

May I examine that, your Honor?

THE COURT:

Now, you're telling me these are a
forgery, then that's . . .

[A lengthy delay while Ms. Nielsen and Mr. Halliday
looked at the Release.]
MR. HANSEN:

I think it's this document with the one
attached to his affidavit as well.

10

THE COURT:

If you're indicating that this is a
forgery, then that's raising the stakes
of this going both ways considerably.
Mr. Halliday?

MR. HALLIDAY:

Your Honor, these appear to be our
signatures, but I don't know how it got
on this document.

THE COURT:

And you don't have the other copy as an
original that you photocopied?

MR. HALLIDAY:

Your Honor, I have our copies where we
crossed it out.

THE COURT:

So you have what?

MR. HALLIDAY:
THE COURT:

We have the copy that we submitted to
the Court.
Okay. But you don't have one with
original signatures any place in your
files or your client's?

MR. HALLIDAY:

No, because we just received the one
release.

THE COURT:

You just received the one?

MR. HALLIDAY:

Just that one, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Okay.

Well, how is it, then, that this

doesn't have the interlineation that MR. HALLIDAY:

I don't know anything about that.

THE COURT:
MR. HALLIDAY:

All right.
Because our copy has it. My affidavit
and my client's affidavit is we crossed
it out, plus my affidavit that
11

Mr. Gehris indicated that we didn't need
to cross it out, that he understood it
was only for property damage, not
personal injury, and that - we crossed
it out.
(R. 123 at 17:8-19:5.)
13.

The court did not believe that the altered Release

submitted by Ms. Nielsen's counsel was a genuine document.

The

original Release was a blue, pre-printed, standard Release form.7
Both Ms. Nielsen and her attorney signed the Release the day
after the settlement draft was issued on June 6, 1991.

The

Release was sent back to Ms. Hefferon's insurer, who stamped it
on the reverse that it was received on June 7, 1991.

The

original Release has no deletions through the personal injury
language.

The altered Release contains interlineations that

plaintiff's counsel admits he made; however the overwhelming
evidence establishes that he had no authority to do so.
14.

The court held that the original Release was

unambiguous and by its plain language settled a personal injury
claim.

(R. 123 at 26:10-22.)
15.

After considering all of the evidence offered by

Ms. Nielsen, the trial court granted the defendant's Motion to

7

See color copy of the original Release attached in the Addendum.
12

Dismiss based on the best evidence rule and the impropriety of
resorting to parol evidence because it found the original Release
to be unambiguous.
16.

(R. 112-115.)

Since the court held that the original Release

preempted any lawsuit that would arise out of the automobile
accident, it properly denied Ms. Nielsen's Motion for Leave to
Amend her Complaint.

Id.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1.

The trial court soundly held that the best

evidence rule requires the use of an original writing to prove
its content.
2.

The trial court soundly dismissed Ms. Nielsen's

Complaint with prejudice since she could not account for the
deletions on her copy of the altered Release.
3.

The trial court soundly dismissed Ms. Nielsen's

Complaint with prejudice since parol evidence is not admissible
to contradict the terms of an unambiguous contract.
4.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when

it denied plaintiff's Motion to Amend her Complaint to add claims
of fraud and bad faith since she could not establish legally
sufficient claims on either theory.

13

5.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when

it denied Ms. Nielsen's Motion to Amend her Complaint because she
was unable to convince the trial court that her altered Release
reflected the agreement of the parties.
6.

Attorneys' fees and double costs should be awarded

in this matter since Ms. Nielsen has brought a frivolous appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE REQUIRES THAT THE ORIGINAL WRITING
BE USED TO PROVE ITS CONTENT.
Rule 1002 of the Utah Rules of Evidence requires that,
to prove the content of a writing, the original writing is
required in evidence.

Its statutory counterpart, Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-25-16, also requires that

NX

[t]here can be no evidence of the

contents of a writing, other than the writing itself' except in a
handful of cases that do not apply to this one.
At oral argument on the Summary Judgment Motion, Ms.
Nielsen's counsel requested to see the original Release for the
first time since it was discovered, saying he would like to
examine it "to see if it's a forgery."

(R. 123 at 17:12-14.)

After reviewing the signatures that were affixed to the original
Release more than six years earlier, Ms. Nielsen's counsel
14

admitted that the signatures on the face of the document were,
indeed, the authentic signatures of his client and himself.

(R.

123 at 18:3-5.)
The trial court held that since "the original Release
bears the signatures of plaintiff and her counsel, the content
and scope of the parties' agreement must be determined from the
original Release."

(R. 113.)

The court went on to hold that the

parties' agreement unambiguously encompassed personal injury
claims later pursued by Ms. Nielsen.

(R. at 114.)

The trial court correctly applied the law and
determined that no genuine issue of material fact existed with
respect to the use and authenticity of the original Release.
Reasonable minds cannot differ that the original Release is the
writing that must be used to prove its contents.

Ms. Nielsen's

counsel does not dispute that his and client's signatures are on
the original Release.
Release exists.

Nor does he dispute that only one original

No material fact exists which could make an

issue of the original Release's authenticity.

15

POINT II
WHEN A PARTY ATTEMPTS TO PRODUCE AN ALTERED WRITING INTO
EVIDENCE, SHE MUST ACCOUNT FOR THE APPEARANCE OF THE ALTERATION
IF IT IS TO BE CONSIDERED GENUINE.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-25-17 requires:

The party producing as genuine a writing
which has been altered,
or appears to have
been altered after Its execution In a part
material to the question In dispute must
account for the appearance of alteration.
He
may show that the alteration was made by
another without his concurrence, or was made
with the consent of the parties affected by
it, or otherwise properly or innocently made,
or that the alteration does not change the
meaning or language of the instrument. If he

does this, he may give the writing
evidence, but not
otherwise.

In

(Emphasis added.)
At oral argument on the Summary Judgment Motion, the
trial court asked Ms. Nielsen's counsel why the original Release
did not bear any interlineation of the personal injury language,
like Ms. Nielsen's copy did.

Ms. Nielsen's counsel replied, "I

don't know anything about that."

16

(R. 123 at 18: 20-23.)

Ms. Nielsen's counsel offered no evidence to establish
that the alteration was made by someone else without his
concurrence because he made the deletion himself.
xx

He admits that

m the presence of my client, I crossed out the words'" relating

to personal injury claims. (R. 58, f 10.)

Nor did he offer any

evidence that he made the deletion with the consent of the
parties affected by it: he avers just the opposite—that Liberty
Mutual's adjuster told him to ignore the personal injury
language.

Since he was skeptical about this, he says he decided

to cross out the language. JEd.

However, the original Releasd

proves this statement inaccurate; no interlineation was made on
the original.

Therefore, plaintiff's arguments constitute a

misrepresentation to this Court.
Ms. Nielsen's counsel also does not claim that the
deletion was properly or innocently made, or that the deletion
does not change the meaning or language of the instrument.

By

deleting the personal injury language in his copy of the release,
he must have intended to change the legal effect of the agreement
and to create an opportunity to pursue a personal injury lawsuit.
This alteration unilaterally renewed the obligations of Ms.

17

Hefferon's estate and its insurer to cover personal injuries

asserted by Ms. Nielsen a year
execution.

and a half

after

the

release's

Ms. Nielsen cannot account for why her altered copy •

has uninitialed and unacknowledged deletions and the original
Release does not.

Since she cannot properly account for the

alterations, her copy cannot be admitted into evidence because it
is not genuine.

The trial court would not permit the altered

Release into evidence, and neither should the Court of Appeals.
POINT III
PAROL EVIDENCE THAT CONTRADICTS THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF AN
UNAMBIGUOUS AGREEMENT IS INADMISSIBLE.
On June 6, 1991, Ms. Nielsen executed the original
Release (R. 37), a color copy of which is attached to the
Addendum of this Brief.

It states, in relevant part:

The undersigned hereby releases and forever
discharges Mary Jane Hefferon and Liberty
Mutual Insurance Company . . . from all
claims and demands, rights and causes of
action of any kind the undersigned now has or
hereafter may have on account of or in any

way growing out of personal
Injuries
existing
or which may exist which are known or unknown
to me at the present
time and property
damage
resulting or to result from an occurrence
which happened on or about September 23,
1990, and do hereby covenant to indemnify and
save harmless the said party or parties from
and against all claims and demands whatsoever
on account of or in any way growing out of
18

said occurrence or its results both to
person
and property.
This release expresses a full
and complete
SETTLEMENT of a
liability
claimed
and denied
. ..
(Emphasis added.)

Above the space for Plaintiff's signature, the

Release states in large, bold capital letters,
FINAL SETTLEMENT.

xx

YOU ARE MAKING A

THIS IS A RELEASE: READ BEFORE SIGNING."

It

is signed by plaintiff Vickie M. Nielsen and witnessed by her
attorney, Paul M. Halliday, Jr.
Compromise and settlement agreements are contractual in
nature and should be construed and enforced under general
contract principles.

Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987).

A party to a contract may not resort to parol evidence to attempt
to vary or contradict the clear and unambiguous terms of a
contract.

Hall v. Process Instruments and Control, Inc./ 890

P.2d 1024, 1026-27 (Utah 1995).
In Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 907 P.2d 264
(Utah 1995), the Utah Supreme Court explained that a court may
consider a writing in light of surrounding circumstances in order
to make a preliminary determination as to whether there is any
ambiguity in the contract.

id. at 268.

If, after considering

all credible parol evidence offered to prove the intentions of
the parties, the court determines that the language of the
19

contract is not ambiguous, then the parties' intentions must be
determined solely from the language of the contract/'

Id,

After considering all the evidence presented, the trial
court soundly held that the language of the original Release had
no ambiguity, that there was no need to resort to parol evidence,
and that the parties' intent would be solely determined by the
plain terms of the agreement.

(R. 113-114.)

Once she settled all her demands and the agreement was
fully executed, Ms. Nielsen cannot now be heard to say that she
did not really settle all demands but that, on the contrary, she
reserved her personal injury claim.

It is implausible that

Ms. Nielsen misunderstood the force, effect and import of the
agreement she signed and her attorney witnessed, or that she did
not know that she discharged all claims and demands she had or
might have against Ms. Hefferon or her insurer arising from the
automobile accident.
waived all

In exchange for a sum of money, Ms. Nielsen

her claims against the defendant.

original Release were plain and unambiguous.

The terms of the
When she signed the

original Release, she assumed the risk that she could develop
personal injuries that would go uncompensated.

Ms. Nielsen had

the opportunity to exercise her freedom of choice as between
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executing the agreement or not doing so.

She consciously, and

with legal advice, chose to execute the original Release; it
cannot be said that this was not voluntary on her part.

This is

not a case where an adjuster shoved a release under the nose of a
recently injured person; Ms. Nielsen had an attorney for several
months who endeavored to secure a settlement for her.
In submitting parol evidence, Ms. Nielsen is asking the
Court to hold that, although the original Release expressly
includes known and unknown personal injuries and property damage,
in fact it only applies to property damage.

Even if parol

evidence were permitted to vary the terms of the agreement, the
credible parol evidence will still not alter the parties'
intentions.

Ms. Nielsen's reliance upon parol evidence to

rewrite the original Release is misplaced, and it should be
construed according to its clear and unambiguous language.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO AMEND HER COMPLAINT TO ADD
CLAIMS OF FRAUD AND BAD FAITH SINCE
SHE COULD NOT ESTABLISH LEGALLY SUFFICIENT
CLAIMS ON EITHER COUNT.
Fraud is never presumed, and a contract should not be
adjudged void for fraud unless the allegations and proofs of
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fraud are clear, precise, and indubitable if it is to reach a
jury.

Kellev v. Salt Lake Transp. Co., 116 P.2d 383 (Utah 1941).

"It has been more than once held that it is error to submit a
question of fraud to the jury upon slight
overturn a written instrument."
added.)

116 P.2d 385.

parol

evidence

to

(Citation omitted, emphasis

The issue is not for the jury when

reasonable minds cannot find the facts to support material and
fraudulent alteration of documents.

Zions First Nat'l. v. Rocky

Mt. Irr., 795 P.2d 658, 662 (Utah 1990).
To show successfully that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying Ms. Nielsen's Motion to Amend her Complaint
to add claims of fraud and bad faith, Ms. Nielsen had the burden
to prove that the release was procured by fraud and bad faith and
that she could legally establish these sufficient claims.
v. Banqart, 525 P.2d 602, 608 (Utah 1974).

Lamb

However, if in fact

fraud or bad faith occurred here, it is obvious that it was not
on the part of the defendant or its insurer.
To show that her fraud claim was legally sufficient,
Ms. Nielsen must have stated with particularity the circumstances
supporting each element of fraud.

22

Otsuka Elec. v. Imaging

Specialists, 937 P.2d 1274, 1278 (Utah App. 1997).

The elements

of fraud are:
1.

That a representation was made;

2.

Concerning a presently existing material
fact;

3.

Which is false;

4.

Which the representor either (a) knew to
be false or (b) made recklessly, knowing
that he had insufficient knowledge upon
which to base such representation;

5.

For the purpose of inducing the other
party to act upon it;

6.

That the other party acting reasonably
and in ignorance of its falsity;

7.

Did upon rely upon it;

8.

And was thereby induced to act;

9.

To his injury and damage.

Otsuka, 937 P.2d 1278, citing Pace v. Parnsh, 247 P.2d 273, 27475 (1952); accord Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d
1060, 1066-67 (Utah 1996).
The only representation that Ms. Nielsen claims was
made to her was that Mr. Gehris of Liberty Mutual allegedly told
her attorney that, in spite of the fact that the original Release
contained language that included the release of personal injury
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claims, she should go ahead and ignore that language and pretend
it wasn't there.

(R. at 58.)

However, it cannot be said that

Ms. Nielsen and her attorney acted reasonably and in ignorance of
this falsity, when they have each provided affidavits to the
effect that they did not trust Mr. Gehns's statements and that
they wanted the personal injury language out of the release.
58, § 10; R. 53, § 6.)

(R.

They did not rely upon Mr. Gehns's

representations nor were they induced to act by them.
In order to proffer a legally sufficient claim of bad
faith, Ms. Nielsen needed to show that Ms. Hefferon or her
insurer acted in bad faith.

A finding of bad faith is a mixed

question of law and fact that turns on a factual determination of
a party's subjective intent.

Valcarce v. Fitzgerald/ 961 P.2d

305, 316 (Utah 1998), citing Tavlor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d
163, 171 (Utah App. 1989).

The trial court is given relatively

broad discretion in concluding whether bad faith has been
sufficiently shown.

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah

1994) .
Ms. Nielsen had the burden to show that one or more of
these bad faith factors existed: 1) the party lacked an honest
belief in the propriety of the activities in question; 2) the
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party intended to take unconscionable advantage of others; or 3)
the party intended to or acted with the knowledge that the
activities in question would hinder, delay, or defraud others,
Valcarce, 961 P.2d 316, citing Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151
(Utah 1983) .
Ms. Nielsen asserted none of these bad faith factors to
the court below.

She could not support such assertions because

she had counsel who was negotiating a settlement for her and it
could not be said that the Liberty Mutual claims adjuster was
operating with any advantage over Ms. Nielsen.

Indeed, Ms.

Hefferon and her insurer were the ones who were compromised by
the proffer of Ms. Nielsen's altered Release and her assertions
of fraud and bad faith.

The trial court's concluding remarks to

defendant Ms. Hefferon's counsel are worth repeating here:
The record should reflect, counsel, that I'm
going to return the original release to you.
At some point in the future, it may become
important as to whether this document is in
existence. I don't want it in the court
files to disappear or get lost someplace.
The party who has the most at stake ought to
guard this, and I return it to you.
(R. 123 at 26:23-27:4.)
The trial court's denial of Ms. Nielsen's Motion to
Amend her Complaint was clearly not an abuse of discretion since
25

Ms. Nielsen could not remotely establish legally sufficient
claims of fraud or baa faith.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED MS. NIELSEN'S
MOTION TO AMEND HER COMPLAINT BECAUSE SHE WAS
UNABLE TO PERSUADE THE COURT THAT THE ALTERED RELEASE
REFLECTED THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES.
As stated above, the trial court found that the
original Release was authenticated and signed by Ms. Nielsen and
her attorney.

The court was not persuaded that the altered

Release with the deleted terms was a genuine writing that was
admissible evidence.
Since the altered Release was inadmissible, the court
had no basis upon which to grant Ms. Nielsen's Motion to Amend
her Complaint.

The altered Release did not reflect the agreement

of the parties; it only reflected the desires of Ms. Nielsen that
she be able to present a personal injury claim she discovered a
year-and-a-half after the automobile accident at issue.

Had the

court been persuaded that a reasonable juror might believe
Ms. Nielsen's altered Release was genuine, then it would have
permitted new claims to be brought.

The trial court was not

fooled by Ms. Nielsen's deletions and neither should the Court of
Appeals be misled by such.
26

POINT VI
MS. NIELSEN'S APPEAL IS FRIVOLOUS
AND ATTORNEYS' FEES AND DOUBLE COSTS SHOULD BE AWARDED
TO THE DEFENDANT FOR HAVING TO DEFEND IT.
When an appeal is not grounded m

fact, not warranted

by existing law, nor based on a good faith argument to extend
existing law, it is deemed frivolous.
Procedure, 33 (b) .

Utah Rule of Appellate

The overwhelming evidence shows that

Ms. Nielsen's challenge to the original Release was unfounded,
because her attorney admits that he made the interlineations on
the altered copy (R. 58 f 10), but he had utterly failed to show
any permission to do so.

Specifically, the original Release

contains no interlineations, so it is apparent that plaintiff's
counsel made changes only to a copy of the Release and only after
the unaltered original Release was signed.

Ms. Nielsen lacked a

scintilla of credible evidence to establish a fraud or bad faith
claim, so her appeal is unfounded and has caused the defendant a
substantial loss of time and expense in having to meet these
groundless allegations.

It is appropriate and just in this case

to award attorneys' fees and double costs for the defense of this
matter.

27

In the face of the obvious fact that the original
Release is legitimate and contains no alterations or
interlineations to the personal injury language, counsel for
plaintiff has persisted in making such outlandish allegations as
fraud and misconduct.

He has attempted to paint both Liberty

Mutual and defense counsel with that brush.

(R. 48, 49, and 95.)

This is improper and unprofessional in any event, but it is made
much worse by plaintiff's counsel's own conduct herein, and his
complete inability to substantiate his claims.
The facts have established by clear and convincing
evidence that only one original Release existed, that the
signatures affixed to the agreement are, in fact, those of
Ms. Nielsen and her attorney, and that - although there is no
eyewitness proof - the only source of the deletion of the
personal injury terms was Ms. Nielsen's attorney.

These clear-

as-crystal facts had to have been obvious to Ms. Nielsen's
counsel, and he should have advised her of the frivolity of the
appeal.

Sanctions, including those beyond the scope of this

appeal, are undoubtedly warranted, but at least this Court should
use Rule 33 to make pLaintiff and her attorney think twice before
bringing such an unwarranted, bad faith appeal.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court soundly decided that the only original
Release that bore the authentic signatures of Ms. Nielsen and her
attorney was a genuine document and was the best evidence of the
parties' intentions.

Any use of parol evidence would have been

improper since the document is plain and unambiguous.

Ms.

Nielsen, with the advice of counsel, contracted away any
potential claims she might have had against Ms. Hefferon or her
insurer.

The altered Release she produced was not genuine and

was inadmissible.

Her legally empty claims of fraud and bad

faith were dismissed by the trial court and she was denied the
ability to Amend her Complaint.

Because Ms. Nielsen's attorney

knew her claims were completely groundless and her appeal farfetched, she should be required to bear the fees and costs of Ms.
Hefferon and her insurer in their defense of this appeal.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED th is *)

day of May, 1999,

RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON

attorneys for
Defendant/Appellee

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two true and correct copies of
the foregoing instrument were mailed, first-class, postage
prepaid, on this ^ ^
day of May, 1999, to the following:
Paul M. Halliday, Jr.
Paul M. Halliday
HALLIDAY, WATKINS & HENRIE
376 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111

8871-363
251146
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ADDENDUM

RELEASE A N D SETTLEMENT " F C L A I M

H|AL 667-013587-05

For the sole consideration nf

0

all

liens

FOUR THOUSAND JONE^OTNDRED
)

(File No.)
( to

include

any

and

—
.dollars ( S 4 1 ^ 6 - 5 0

the undersigned hereby releases and forever discharges

MARY JANE HEFFERON AND LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE CO.

and all other persons, firms and corporations from all claims and demands, rights and causes of action of any kind the undersigned
now has or hereafter may have on account of or in any way growing out of Personal Injuries existing or which may exist which are known
or unknown to me at the present time and Property Damage resulting or to result from an occurrence which happened on or about

23 SEPTEMBER
19 9 0 f a n c | d 0 hereby covenant to indemnify and save harmless the said party or parties from
and against all claims and demands whatsoever on account of or in any way growing out of said occurrence or its results both to person
and property. This release expresses a full and complete S E T T L E M E N T of a liability claimed and denied, regardless of the adequacy
of the above consideration, and the acceptance of this release shall not operate as an admission of liability on the part of anyone nor as
an estoppel, waiver or bar with respect to any claim the party or parties released may have against the undersigned. Witness my hand and seal.
YOU ARE MAKING A FINAL S E T T L E M E N T
(1) Dated

THIS IS A RELEASE: READ BEFORE SIGNING.
I
(2)

(Address)^"

H^/M^)^

,-AU/faMi.

(Signature)

(L-S.)

(3).

(5) •
(Witness' Signature)

(Address)
AjSC-250 R 5

VICKIE NIELSON

Printed in U.S..A

(Signature)

*^o
< * & &

#

78-25-16. Parol evidence of contents of writings - When
admissible.
There can be no evidence of the contents of a writing, other
than the writing itself, except in the following cases:
(1) when the original has been lost or destroyed, in which
case proof of the loss or destruction must first be made;
(2) when the original is in the possession of the party
against whom the evidence is offered and he fails to produce it
after reasonable notice;
(3) when the original is a record or other document in the
custody of a public officer;
(4) when the original has been recorded, and the record or
a certified copy thereof is made evidence by this code or other
statute;
(5) when the original consists of numerous accounts or
other documents which cannot be examined in court without great
loss of time, and the evidence sought from them is only the
general result of the whole.
Provided, however, if any business, institution, member of a
profession or calling, or any department or agency of government,
in the regular course of business or activity has kept or
recorded any memorandum, writing, entry, print, representation or
combination thereof, of any act, transaction, occurrence or
event, and in the regular course of business has caused any or
all of the same to be recorded, copied or reproduced by any
photographic, photostatic, microfilm, microcard, miniature
photographic, or other process which accurately reproduces or
forms a durable medium for so reproducing the original, the
original may be destroyed in the regular course of business
unless its preservation is required by law; and such reproduction, when satisfactorily identified, is as admissible in evidence as the original itself in any judicial or administrative
proceeding whether the original is in existence or not, an
enlargement or facsimile of such reproduction is likewise
admissible in evidence if the original reproduction is in
existence and available for inspection under direction of court.
The introduction of a reproduced record, enlargement or
facsimile, does not preclude admission of the original.
In the cases mentioned in Subsections (3) and (4), a copy of
the original, or of the record, must be produced; in those
mentioned in Subsections (1) and (2), either a copy or oral
evidence of the contents must be given.
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Rule 15.

Amended and Supplemental Pleadings.

(a) Amendments.
A party may amend his pleading once as a
matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is
served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading
is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial
calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 2 0 days after it
is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by
leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and
leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. A party
shall plead in response to an amended pleading within the time
remaining for response to the original pleading or within 10 days
after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be
the longer, unless the court otherwise orders.
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Rule 33.

Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery of
attorney's fees.

(a) Damages for delay or frivolous
appeal.
Except in a
first appeal of right in a criminal case, if the court determines
that a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is either
frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which may
include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or
reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may
order that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's
attorney.
(b) Definitions.
For the purposes of these rules, a
frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one that is
not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based
on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing
law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the
purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such
as to harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation,
or gain time that will benefit only the party filing the appeal,
motion, brief, or other paper.
(c) Procedures.
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or
upon its own motion. A party may request damages under this rule
only as part of the appellee's motion for summary disposition
under Rule 10, as part of the appellee's brief, or as part of a
party's response to a motion or other paper.
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court,
the court shall issue to the party or the party's attorney or
both an order to show cause why such damages should not be
awarded. The order to show cause shall set forth the allegations
which form the basis of the damages and permit at least ten days
in which to respond unless otherwise ordered for good cause
shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of oral
argument.
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be
awarded, the court shall grant a hearing.
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78-27-56. Attorney's fees - Award where action or defense in bad
faith - Exceptions.
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable
attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court determines
that the action or defense to the action was without merit and
not brought or asserted in good faith, except under
Subsection (2).
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or
limited fees against a party under Subsection (1), but only if
the court:
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of
impecuniosity in the action before the court, or
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not
awarding fees under the provision of Subsection (1).
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